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Abstract 
 
In 2009, President Obama pledged that, by 2020, the United States would achieve 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of 17% from 2005 levels. With the failure of 
Congress  to  adopt  comprehensive  climate  legislation  in  2010,  the feasibility  of  the 
pledge was put in doubt. However, we find that the United States is near to reaching 
this goal: the country is currently on course to achieve reductions of 16.3% from 2005 
levels in 2020. Three factors contribute to this outcome: greenhouse gas regulations 
under the Clean Air Act, secular trends including changes in relative fuel prices and 
energy efficiency  and  sub-national  efforts.  Perhaps even  more  surprising,  domestic 
emissions are probably lower than would have been the case if the Waxman-Markey 
cap-and-trade proposal had become law in 2010. At this point, however, the United 
States is expected to fail to meet its financing commitments under the Copenhagen 
Accord for 2020. 
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its Pledge on Climate Change Mitigation 
ECP Report No. 12/October 2012 
Dallas Burtraw and Matt Woerman
 
Introduction 
At the international climate meetings in Copenhagen in December 2009, President Obama pledged 
that by 2020, the United States would achieve reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of 17% 
from 2005 levels.1 Following the failure of the United States to adopt comprehensive climate policy 
through legislation in the 111
th Congress (2009–10), most observers anticipated that the pledge would 
not be met. This paper presents a forecast for US emissions in 2020. Although substantial uncertainty 
remains because important pieces of regulations are still pending, our central estimate indicates that 
the United States is near to reaching this goal. The country is currently on course to achieve reductions 
of 16.3% from 2005 levels in 2020. 
Three factors contribute to this emissions projection. First is regulation under the Clean Air Act. The 
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has already finalised fuel efficiency standards for mobile 
sources and rules for preconstruction permitting under the Act. The most important regulation from 
EPA will be the expected operating performance standards for new and existing stationary sources, 
and the design and stringency of these standards is the most important source of uncertainty in our 
estimate. A second factor is the secular trends in fuel prices and energy efficiency. The advantageous 
change in relative fuel prices has led to a substantial shift toward the use of natural gas and away from 
coal for electricity generation. Meanwhile, a discernible reduction in the energy intensity of economic 
activity is stemming from the expanded role of energy efficiency. The economic recession has also 
had an overall influence on reducing current emissions, but this will have less of an influence by 2020. 
The third factor is the effect of sub-national efforts to reduce emissions, including cap and trade in 
California and nine north-eastern states, renewable portfolio standards for electricity generation in 29 
states and energy efficiency resource standards in 24 states. 
The United States is about on track to achieve President Obama’s Copenhagen pledge with respect to 
mitigation goals. Perhaps even more surprisingly, emissions in the domestic US economy under the 
current status quo, which we label the ‘Clean Air Act regime’, will probably be less in 2020 than 
would have occurred if the Waxman–Markey cap-and-trade proposal (H.R. 2454) had become law in 
2010. That legislation would have achieved a roughly 30% reduction in emissions by 2020, but two-
thirds of those reductions would have come from international and domestic offsets and many of those 
emissions  reductions  would  have  contributed  to  a  bank  of  emissions  allowances  that  would  have 
reappeared  as  emissions  in  later  years.  The  legislation  also  would  have  pre-empted  many  of  the 
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activities that are responsible for emissions reductions under the Clean Air Act regime. On the other 
hand, the legislation also would have offered a greater element of certainty with respect to the US 
emissions profile and presumably a lower cost, even if the expected level of emissions reductions 
would have been less. 
Although the United States is close to meeting its pledge regarding domestic emissions, one must be 
less optimistic about the ability of the country to fulfil  its pledge for international financing. The 
United States joined other developed countries in committing to support emissions  mitigation and 
adaptation in developing countries through financing that would grow to $100 billion per year from 
public and private sources by 2020. However, the United States has not put a plan in place to achieve 
its share of this commitment (Purvis, 2012). The public contribution to the financing goals in future 
years  appears  to  be  insufficient.  The  contribution  of  private  capital,  including  payments  for 
international  offsets,  was  expected  to  fulfil  the  lion’s  share  of  the  US  financing  commitment  but 
international offsets play no role in meeting regulations under the Clean Air Act (Richardson, 2012). 
Private  investment capital  in  energy resource  development already substantially  exceeds the $100 
billion target, but this cannot be seen as an additional source of funding, as implied by the Copenhagen 
Accord. At this point, the United States is expected to fail to meet its financing commitments for 2020. 
Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act 
The modern Clean Air Act, passed in 1970, conveys broad authority to the EPA to develop regulations 
to mitigate harm from air pollution. In 2007, the Supreme Court confirmed that this authority applies 
to the regulation of GHGs.2 Subsequently, the agency made a formal, science-based determination that 
GHGs are dangerous to human health and the environment, which compels the agency to develop 
regulations to mitigate the harm. Those regulations will take shape in three ways (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Three pathways to GHG regulation under the US Clean Air Act 
 
Source: Richardson et al. (2011). 
At  the  time  of  President  Obama’s  pledge  in  Copenhagen  in  2009,  modelling  by  the  US  Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) forecast emissions in the United States under a business as usual 
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baseline to be 6,689 million tonnes in 2020 from sources covered by Waxman-Markey.3 The EIA 
reports  that  emissions  in  2005  were  6,741  million  tonnes  (EIA,  2009a).  The  target  identified  in 
Copenhagen would have reduced emissions by 2020 to 17% below 2005 levels, resulting in emissions 
of 5,595 million tonnes in 2020. In this section we review actions and trends in place and in progress 
that have an effect on the expected level of emissions in 2020 with a special focus on changes that 
were not included in EIA’s forecast in 2009.  
Mobile Sources 
More stringent vehicle fuel economy standards mandated by the Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007 were proposed in 2009 and finalised in May 2010. The standards, which took effect in 
January  2011, affect  cars  and  trucks  beginning  with  the  2012  model  year. The  standards  impose 
annual improvements in fuel efficiency of 5% per year, raising the fleet average fuel efficiency for 
light trucks and sport utility vehicles to 30 miles per gallon by 2016, and to 39 miles per gallon for 
cars, resulting  in a combined fleet average  of 35.5  miles per  gallon. Over the  next  decade, these 
standards  are  expected  to  roughly  offset  increases  in  vehicle  miles  travelled;  over  the  life  of  the 
programme, they are expected to reduce GHG emissions from these vehicles by 990 million tonnes 
compared  to  business  as  usual.  Because  of  these  increased  fuel  economy  standards,  as  well  as 
changing consumer preferences, emissions per driver of newly purchased vehicles fell by 20% from 
October 2007 to July 2012 (Sivak & Schoettle, 2012). 
Even stricter standards that have since been developed and finalised are expected to require additional 
fuel efficiency improvements of 40%, to be phased in beginning in 2017 and ultimately raising the 
combined fleet average equivalent to 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025. These standards are expected to 
reduce GHG emissions by roughly 2 billion tonnes over the lifetime of 2017–25 model year vehicles. 
Complementary regulations addressing medium- and heavy-duty vehicles will take effect in 2014. 
Permitting for Stationary Sources 
In January 2011, the EPA also adopted regulations for preconstruction permitting for major new and 
modified  sources,  such  as  power  plants  and  industrial  facilities.  Permitting  requires  site-specific, 
technology-based review of control technology. Permitting is implemented at the state level, although 
the  technological  inquiry  is  national  in  scope  and  subject  to  EPA  oversight.  Under  current  EPA 
guidelines, this permitting process applies to about 900 construction projects per year at sources that 
emit large quantities of GHGs.  
Performance Standards for Stationary Sources 
The  third  regulatory  action  still  anticipated  by  EPA  will  be  the  implementation  of  operating 
performance  standards  affecting  new  and,  in  particular,  existing  stationary  facilities.4  The  first 
proposed standards, issued in April 2012 for new fossil-steam power plants, require these plants to 
achieve a carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions rate of 1,000 pounds per megawatt-hour; this is based on the 
performance of a new natural gas combined-cycle plant. A new coal-fired plant would be required to 
install carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) to achieve this emissions rate. However, the standard 
includes a provision that allows a coal plant to operate for up to 10 years without CCS if it then installs 
CCS so that it achieves a 30-year average emissions rate that meets the standard of 1,000 pounds per 
megawatt-hour.  Similar  new  source  performance  standards  for  other  source  categories  –including 
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refineries, pulp and paper, iron and steel, and other emitting sources –are expected to roll out over 
time. 
Once EPA has finalised its standards for new sources in a particular source category, the Clean Air 
Act requires that the agency begin to develop standards for existing sources in that category. Existing 
stationary facilities are the source of the largest share of GHG emissions and provide the greatest 
opportunity for cost-effective reductions in emissions, according to economy-wide modelling (EIA, 
2009a). Existing  steam  boilers  at  power  plants  fuelled  with  coal,  oil  and  natural  gas,  along  with 
petroleum  refineries,  account  for  more  than  one-third  of  GHG  emissions  in  the  United  States. 
Conceivably, the EPA could issue standards that mandate large-scale substitution away from coal to 
natural  gas  or  non-emitting  technologies.  However,  indications  are  that  the  EPA  will  not  issue 
standards that require a major substitution away from coal. Instead, the agency is looking initially at 
improving the operating efficiency of power plants and refineries while rewarding, but not requiring, 
the substitution from coal to natural gas.  
In its preliminary notice of a proposed rulemaking, the agency indicated that operating efficiency at 
existing  facilities  might  be  improved  by  2–5%,  resulting  in  a  comparable  reduction  in  emissions 
without changing the electricity output from these facilities (EPA, 2008). A 5% reduction in emissions 
from existing coal-fired power plants would amount to over 90 million tonnes per year, or about 1.4% 
of total US emissions. The agency identified the possibility of additional emissions reductions of 2–
5%  if  coal-fired  facilities  co-fired  with  biomass.  Larger  emissions  reductions  may  result  if  the 
regulations explicitly enable co-firing with or substitution to natural gas at existing coal-fired facilities 
as a way to achieve an emissions rate reduction on average. 
Across all the stationary source categories identified in the EPA’s technical documents, emissions total 
62% of domestic emissions (Burtraw et al., 2011). Existing studies identified by the EPA uncover 
opportunities to reduce emissions from these sectors by up to 10%, or 6.2% of total US emissions. 
These short-term measures, which include energy and process efficiency improvements, the beneficial 
use  of  process  gases,  and  limited  material  and  product  changes,  have  been  identified  by  various 
authors as “cost-effective,” meaning that they are zero-cost options for a firm after accounting for the 
cost of energy saved. These calculations apply engineering costs based on case studies, but have been 
validated in one econometric study of operating efficiency in the electricity sector (Linn et al., 2012).  
Perhaps more important than the stringency of the regulations in the long run is how the EPA chooses 
to structure regulations, because this will identify a pathway for ongoing regulatory activity. Figure 1 
illustrates that a performance standard approach was chosen over other potential sources of authority 
under the  Act.5 The primary responsibility for implementation and  enforcement resides  with state 
governments, which will submit plans indicating how they will implement and achieve the EPA’s 
environmental goals. Many authors have encouraged the EPA to issue a strong model rule that could 
be adopted by each state and that would implement a uniform, cost-effective national trading program. 
However, this raises a dilemma in the potential transfers of wealth across regions. The EPA could 
choose to develop subcategories within a sector based on technology type or region of the country. 
Departure from a uniform national programme would allow emissions rate averaging or trading, for 
example through regional programs, but the greater the degree of sub-categorisation, the higher total 
national costs are likely to be (Burtraw & Woerman, 2012). An alternative to a process driven by the 
EPA is one that embraces a variety of approaches proposed by the states, each calibrated to meet or 
exceed the EPA standard. The structure, timing, and stringency of this regulation are the major sources 
of uncertainty in US emissions profile.  
                                                   
5
 Richardson et al. (2011) outline the alternatives and the advantages of a performance standard approach. AS ASSESSMENT OF US PROGRESS TOWARDS ITS PLEDGE ON CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION | 5 
Secular Trends in Natural Gas Supply and Energy Efficiency 
Over  the  past  three  years,  expectations  about  future  prices  of  natural  gas  and  future  demand  for 
electricity have evolved substantially, as reflected in adjustments to the energy forecasts produced by 
EIA in its Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2009b; EIA, 2011). Between 2009 and 2011, forecasts of 
future natural gas supply expanded multiple times, and the expected level of future natural gas prices 
fell significantly. Coincidentally, forecasts of demand levels and growth are also lower because of the 
current economic downturn as well as expanded investments in energy efficiency that accumulate over 
time. 
Figure 2. Electricity consumption (terawatt-hours) 
   
Source: Adapted from Burtraw et al. (2012). 
To observe how these secular trends affect the electricity sector, we solve Resources for the Future’s 
Haiku electricity market model two times, once calibrated to EIA’s 2009 forecast and once calibrated 
to EIA’s 2011 forecast. 6 The change in electricity demand due to these differing forecasts is illustrated 
in Figure 2. Reduced demand for electricity leads to a reduction in the amount of electricity generated, 
yielding CO2 emissions reductions. The increased supply of natural gas also reduces CO2 emissions as 
coal-fired generation is replaced by natural gas generation that is less carbon intensive. The change in 
generation mix expected in the year 2020 is shown in Figure 3. The combined effect of these secular 
trends in the electricity sector is expected to reduce CO2 emissions in 2020 by 240 million tonnes 
(Burtraw et al., 2012). 
                                                   
6 See Paul et al. (2009) for documentation on the Haiku electricity market model. 
3,500
3,750
4,000
4,250
4,500
4,750
5,000
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
2009 Forecast 2011 Forecast6 | BURTRAW & WOERMAN 
Figure 3. Electricity generation mix in 2020 (terawatt hours) 
   
Source: Adapted from Burtraw et al. (2012). 
Sub-National Policy  
Many recent efforts at the state and regional level have sought to reduce emissions of GHGs, either 
directly, through a cap-and-trade policy, or indirectly, by mandating the increased use of renewables in 
generating electricity or the displacement of electricity demand with energy efficiency. Significant 
attention is currently focused on California, which will launch a cap-and-trade programme affecting 
the electricity and industrial sectors in 2013; the programme will expand to include the transportation 
sector, covering 85% of GHG emissions in 2015. This programme is part of the implementation of 
California’s  2006  law  that  requires  the  state  to  reduce  its  GHG  emissions  (including  emissions 
associated with imported electricity) to 1990 levels by 2020. Implementation of the law is expected to 
yield emissions reductions of 88 million tonnes per year from business as usual. Regulatory standards 
and measures are already in place to achieve 78% of this emissions target (Burtraw & Szambelan, 
2012). 
Another sub-national cap-and-trade program is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which 
comprises  nine  states  in  the  north-east.  The  RGGI  covers  emissions  from  fossil-fuelled  electric 
generators and seeks to reduce emissions by 10% by 2018 relative to levels observed in 2009, which 
was the first year of compliance under this programme. For several reasons, including secular trends 
within the electricity sector, the price of RGGI allowances is currently at the programme’s price floor, 
resulting in emissions below the level required by the cap. For example, in 2011, emissions covered by 
the RGGI program were 44 million tonnes below the policy’s cap. Nonetheless, the price floor in the 
programme auction has returned nearly $1 billion in revenue, which has been directed in large part 
towards energy efficiency investments in the region (Hibbard et al., 2011).  
Policies to reduce GHG emissions have also been enacted at the state level. In 29 states plus the 
District of Columbia, renewable portfolio standards mandate that a specified percentage of electricity 
must  be  generated  by  renewable  sources.  In  24  states,  fully-funded  energy-efficiency  resource 
standards establish specific, long-term targets for energy savings that must be met through electricity 
or natural gas energy efficiency programmes. Although these policies do not directly reduce GHG 
emissions, the increased use of renewable generators and the reduction in energy demand decreases 
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the use of carbon-intensive fossil fuels. In most states, the percentage of electricity that is required to 
be renewable and the amount of demand displaced by energy efficiency will increase over the next 
decade, with many policies reaching the maximum stringency around the year 2020. 
Adding up the Pieces: Projected US Emissions in 2020  
We have identified three factors that contribute to emissions reductions in the United States. First, 
under  the  Clean  Air  Act,  EPA  has  produced  GHG  regulations  affecting  mobile  sources  and 
preconstruction  permitting.  Regulations  governing  the  operation  of  stationary  sources  are  in 
development,  although  at  a  slow  pace.  Taken  together,  these  initiatives  are  expected  to  achieve 
emissions reductions of 10.5% by 2020 compared to a 2005 baseline. It is uncertain whether these 
reductions will be fully realised, but the legal and institutional dominoes are in place for this to occur.  
Second,  secular  trends  in  the  economy,  including  changing  relative  fuel  prices  and  the  expanded 
influence  of  energy  efficiency,  will  lead  to  additional  reductions  in  the  electricity  sector  that  we 
measure to be 3.3%, compared to 2005 levels.  
Third, sub-national policies are increasingly important. California’s goal, embedded in state law; cap 
and trade in the Northeast (RGGI); and state renewable electricity and energy efficiency programmes 
should  contribute  additional  emissions  reductions.  These  sub-national  policies  alone,  without  the 
effects of secular trends in the electricity sector or any new regulations under the Clean Air Act, put 
the United States on target to have emissions 2.5% below 2005 levels. Total reductions by 2020, 
accounting for all three factors, are on track to yield emissions reductions of 16.3%, relative to 2005 
levels. The contribution from each of these three factors is displayed in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Components of emissions reductions below 2005 levels (%) under the Clean Air Act regime 
 
Emissions May Be Lower than under Cap and Trade 
Comprehensive  climate  legislation  proposed  in  the  111th  Congress,  known  as  Waxman–Markey, 
would have introduced an emissions cap-and-trade system covering over 84.5% of emissions in the 
US economy. The cap in 2020 was calibrated to be 17% below 2005 levels and in alignment with 
President Obama’s Copenhagen pledge. In fact, the emissions reductions by 2020 were expected by 
EIA to be substantially greater than that, with the  excess accumulating in an  emissions bank that 
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would reappear in later years (EIA, 2009a). However, the lion’s share of the emissions reductions was 
expected to occur through offsets; less than half were expected to occur at sources covered by the 
emissions cap. Further, the legislation  would  have  explicitly or implicitly  pre-empted  most of the 
emissions reductions that are expected to occur under its alternative, the Clean Air Act regime. In 
Table 1 we report that expected total reductions by 2020 of 16.3% relative to 2005 levels within the 
covered sectors of the US economy will be greater under the Clean Air Act than would have occurred 
under cap and trade.  
EIA’s  modelling  of  Waxman–Markey  in  2009  anticipated  that  the  United  States  would  achieve 
emissions reductions, including offsets, of 33.6% by 2020. However, emissions reductions at covered 
domestic sources were expected to total 10.2%. Of the 33.6%, 4.7 percentage points were expected to 
come  from  domestic  offsets,  and  more  than  15  percentage  points  were  expected  to  come  from 
international  offsets—a  policy  tool  unlikely  to  be  available  under  the  Clean  Air  Act  (Richardson 
2012). These estimates are presented in the first row under the Cap and Trade Implementation section 
in Table 1. Further, about 45% of these reductions would have contributed to the emissions bank. If 
one  considers  the  contribution  to  the  emissions  bank  ephemeral  and  likely  to  appear  as  actual 
emissions in a later year, then the permanent emissions reductions from sources regulated under the 
emissions cap in the US economy would have been 5.6%. Counting emissions from domestic offsets, 
this number would be 8.2%. 
Some of the factors contributing emissions reductions under the status quo Clean Air Act regime, 
including changes in the economy since 2009, also would have had an effect under the cap-and-trade 
program. For  example, the change  in relative fuel prices—and  especially the  expanded supply  of 
natural gas—would have occurred with or without cap and trade. However, the emissions reductions 
that would have been achieved with or without cap and trade are actually quite different because an 
emissions cap also serves as an emissions floor; that is, it specifies not only the maximum but also the 
minimum emissions that can occur. Under an emissions cap, because maximum emissions are fixed at 
the  national  level,  the  actions  of  agents  within  the  economy  cannot  affect  the  overall  level  of 
emissions. Any effort to reduce emissions by one entity, including state and local governments or 
private parties, does not affect the overall level of emissions (Shobe & Burtraw, 2009; Goulder & 
Stavins,  2011).  With  an  emissions  cap,  efforts  to  reduce  emissions  by  one  party  make  possible 
additional emissions by another party. The emissions floor undermines the contribution of emissions 
reductions through a number of venues—including aspects of the Clean Air Act or actions by state and 
local governments to adopt measures unilaterally that may contribute to local emissions reductions—
because leakage of emissions to other jurisdictions would be 100%. In effect, a cap-and-trade program 
at the national level pre-empts efforts to achieve additional emissions reductions through other means. 
Although total emissions may not change under a national cap, agents may undertake actions that shift 
emissions reductions between different sources under the cap. When additional domestic reductions 
are achieved within one sector or geographic region, either due to changing trends in the economy or 
additional policies at the national or sub-national level, the marginal cost of reductions decreases. The 
lower  marginal cost  leads to a rebound  effect  with  fewer  domestic reductions  in  other sectors or 
regions and fewer purchases of emissions offsets. For example, a policy that reduces emissions within 
the electricity sector would yield emissions below what would otherwise be required to attain the cap, 
which results in a lower allowance price. This reduced allowance price causes emitters in other sectors 
to  increase  their  emissions  and  purchase  fewer  offsets. The  net  effect  is  an  increase  in  domestic 
reductions, but the additional emissions reductions are less than 100% of what would have occurred in 
the absence of the cap. 
In the absence of cap and trade, the first factor we identified that would yield emissions reductions is 
the Clean Air Act. The 2007 vehicle standards that took effect in 2011 were included in EIA’s baseline 
projections for Waxman–Markey. However, new standards proposed in 2011, which take effect in 
2017, could very well have been effectively pre-empted by the passage of Waxman–Markey because 
the cap would have introduced a price on carbon, resulting in a strong policy argument to let the price 
substitute for other regulatory efforts. In our central estimate of the cap-and-trade program, we assume AS ASSESSMENT OF US PROGRESS TOWARDS ITS PLEDGE ON CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION | 9 
that these additional fuel economy standards would not have been finalised, but we do estimate a 
sensitivity case with the standards in place. Under the Clean Air Act regime, these vehicle standards 
are projected to achieve additional reductions of approximately 220 million tonnes in 2020, or 3% of 
benchmark emissions. If they were to occur under the Waxman–Markey cap-and-trade programme, 
however,  we  estimate  that  about  one-fifth  of  the  emissions  reductions  would  have  been  partially 
crowded out by emissions increases elsewhere, resulting in a smaller change in domestic emissions of 
175  million tonnes. Other aspects  of EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs under the  Act, including 
permitting and performance standards for stationary sources, would have been explicitly pre-empted. 
The second factor yielding emissions reductions under the Clean Air Act regime is secular trends in 
the  economy.  Reductions  in  the  electricity  sector  arising  from  greater  use  of  natural  gas  and  an 
expanded role for energy efficiency also would have occurred with Waxman–Markey, but because of 
the emissions cap, they would not have directly resulted in equivalent emissions reductions. Instead, as 
described above, some of these reductions would have been crowded out by increased emissions in 
other sectors of the domestic economy, resulting in approximately four-fifths of the reductions being 
additional under a national cap. 
The third factor yielding emissions reductions in the absence of cap and trade is the sub-national effort 
by state and local governments. Waxman–Markey would not have pre-empted the ability of California 
or other states to set their own emissions reduction goals or to pursue related goals, such as renewable 
energy targets  or  efficiency standards. These policies  might still  have  emerged  even  if  Waxman–
Markey had become law, although arguments to rescind them would have been strong. If they were 
not rescinded, then under the cap-and-trade system many of these sub-national efforts would have 
become non-binding, and therefore would have provided no additional emissions reductions. For sub-
national policies that remained binding, again these emissions reductions would have been partially 
crowded out by emissions increases elsewhere, resulting in a smaller change in domestic emissions 
given the overall national cap. 
To estimate that portion of the emissions reductions from the three factors we outline that would have 
been additional under cap and trade, we solve Resources for the Future’s Haiku electricity market 
model with a reduced-form representation of emissions reduction opportunities for the rest of the US 
economy, and for the availability of offsets, that is calibrated to EIA’s National Energy Modeling 
System. Haiku includes projections of electricity demand and natural gas prices that correspond to the 
secular trends discussed above, as well as the sub-national policies. These results are reported as the 
2012 RFF Forecast under the Cap and Trade Implementation section in Table 1. 
We estimate the comprehensive cap-and-trade program proposed for the United States in 2009–2010 
would have yielded emissions reductions in the domestic economy of 13.6% in 2020, compared to 
2005 levels. Total emissions reductions accounting for offsets would total 32.4%. This estimate is 
slightly smaller than that anticipated in the EIA analysis of Waxman-Markey because we use RFF’s 
electricity model and because of other changes in the economy that are accounted for. As with the EIA 
analysis  of  Waxman–Markey,  a  large  portion  of  these  reductions  would  have  contributed  to  the 
allowance bank and would have reappeared in later years as emissions. Accounting for the ephemeral 
nature  of  these  reductions,  the  cap-and-trade  program  would  have  achieved  domestic  emissions 
reductions of only 7.9% in 2020. In contrast, the anticipated emissions reductions under the Clean Air 
Act regime total 16.3%, exceeding those reductions within the United States that would have occurred 
under cap and trade. Table 1 displays the reductions achieved by these different policies, as well as the 
portion  of reductions achieved by  domestic reductions, domestic  offsets, international  offsets, and 
non-market offsets.7 Below, we examine several sensitivity cases with different assumptions about 
reductions under a national cap, which are also included in Table 1. 
                                                   
7
 The Waxman-Markey proposal included 3% of additional reductions that would be achieved by the purchase of 
international offsets outside of the cap-and-trade system, which we denote as “non-market offsets.” 10 | BURTRAW & WOERMAN 
It is especially noteworthy that the comparison ignores the contribution of emissions reductions, both 
domestically and abroad, through the purchase of offsets. Global emissions may have been lower with 
the passage of Waxman–Markey, but surprisingly, in the sectors of the domestic economy covered by 
the emissions cap, they likely would have been more than will occur under the Clean Air Act regime. 
Table 1. Emissions reductions below 2005 levels (%) in 2020 
Scenario 
Domestic 
reductions 
Domestic 
offsets 
International 
offsets 
Non-market 
offsets 
Total 
reductions 
Clean Air Act regime          
RFF forecast  16.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  16.3 
Cap and trade implementation:       
2009 EIA forecast  10.2  4.7  15.8  3.0  33.6 
   Adjusted for banking  5.6  2.6  8.8  3.0  20.0 
2012 RFF forecast 
(Secular trends)  13.6  4.2  11.6  3.0  32.4 
   Adjusted for banking  7.9  2.4  6.7  3.0  20.0 
2012 RFF w/ fuel 
Economy standards  15.9  3.8  10.4  3.0  33.0 
   Adjusted for banking  9.0  2.1  5.9  3.0  20.0 
2012 RFF w/ risk-
adjusted (10%) discount 
rate 
12.3  3.7  7.9  3.0  26.9 
   Adjusted for banking  8.7  2.6  5.6  3.0  20.0 
2012 RFF w/ bank 
ending in 2035  10.9  3.1  3.0  3.0  20.0 
   Adjusted for banking  10.9  3.1  3.0  3.0  20.0 
Domestic Offsets 
Our central estimate of reductions under Waxman–Markey includes 282 million tonnes of emissions 
offsets purchased domestically, or 4.2% of 2005 emissions. Although these reductions would not have 
occurred  within the  covered sectors of the policy, they  would  have  occurred  within the  domestic 
economy. Consequently,  one  may choose to  include these  offsets  when  estimating the amount  of 
emissions reductions that would have been achieved domestically. If we include domestic offsets, we 
find that Waxman–Markey would have achieved domestic reductions in 2020 of 17.8% compared to 
2005 levels.  Again, these  emissions reductions can  be adjusted to account for reductions that are 
banked and will reappear as emissions in a later year. If this is done, we find that Waxman–Markey 
yields domestic reductions of 10.3%, relative to 2005 levels. 
It is important to note that the 2005 levels, to which these reductions are compared, count only the 
emissions from the covered sectors and do not include the sectors in which the offsets would occur. 
Thus the comparison does not have sectoral equivalence, but that is precisely the intent of offsets, to 
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Fuel Economy Standards 
In our central estimate of Waxman–Markey, we assume that the fuel economy standards proposed in 
2011, and set to take effect in 2017, would not have occurred if Waxman–Markey had been enacted. 
However, it is possible these increased standards would have been finalised even with the passage of 
Waxman-Markey. In this case, the standards would provide additional emissions reductions within the 
transportation sector, although some of these reductions would be crowded out by increased emissions 
in other sectors and the purchase of fewer emissions offsets. We estimate the inclusion of these fuel 
economy standards would result in domestic emissions reductions in 2020 of 15.9% compared to 2005 
levels. If these emissions reductions are adjusted to account for reductions that are banked and will 
appear in later years, we find domestic reductions in 2020 of 9.0%, relative to 2005 levels. 
Banking Sensitivities 
The Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade program allows for the banking of emissions allowances to be 
used in later years. However, future session of Congress or regulators could pass additional legislation 
or rules to weaken or completely abolish the cap-and-trade program, which would have a considerable 
effect  on  the  value  of  banked  allowances.  The  evolution  of  regulations  for  sulphur  dioxide  and 
nitrogen oxides culminating in the proposed Cross State Air Pollution Rule is a precedent for how 
subsequent  regulation  can  affect  the  value  of  banked  allowances  (Fraas  &  Richardson,  2012). 
Consequently  one  would  expect firms to anticipate the risk  of regulatory change in their banking 
behaviour in future market-based programmes. 
In our central estimate of Waxman-Markey, we use a discount rate of 7.4% to calculate the return on 
holding allowances; this is the same rate used by EIA in their 2009 analysis of the Waxman-Markey 
legislation. However, with the risk that banked allowances could become less valuable in the future, 
investors  would  likely  require  a  greater  annual  return  in  order  to  hold  the  allowances  (Salant  & 
Henderson, 1978). To represent this risk premium, we also modelled Waxman-Markey with a 10% 
risk-adjusted discount rate for allowances, which yields a lower allowance price in the early years of 
the program and consequently fewer emissions reductions and a smaller purchase of offsets. This 10% 
discount rate results in domestic emissions reductions in 2020 of 12.3% compared to 2005 levels. If 
these reductions are adjusted to account for allowances that are banked in 2020 and will reappear as 
emissions  in  later  years,  we  find  Waxman-Markey,  with  a  10%  discount  rate  for  banking,  yields 
domestic reductions in 2020 of 8.7%, relative to 2005 levels. 
Another  possible  result  of  the  risk  of  banking  allowances  is  that  investors  may  choose  to  hold 
allowances  for  a  shorter  period  of  time.  In  our  central  estimate  of  Waxman-Markey  we  assume 
banking  persists  throughout  the  life  of  the  program  until  2050.  However,  one  might  expect  that 
investors will hold a smaller portfolio of allowances with a shorter planning horizon in mind due to the 
risk  of  future  legislation  or  rules  changing  their  value.  We  model  this  outcome  using  a  15-year 
planning horizon so that looking forward from 2020 the bank of allowances would be exhausted in 
2035. This results in a lower allowance price through 2035 (and a higher price after 2035), which 
yields  fewer  emissions  reductions  and  a  smaller  purchase  of  offsets  in  the  early  years  of  the 
programme. With this banking outcome, we estimate domestic emissions reductions in 2020 of 10.9% 
compared to 2005 levels. Coincidentally, we find no incremental contribution to the bank occurs in 
2020 in this sensitivity case; allowances are banked in earlier years, and these banked allowances are 
used in later years, but in 2020 the number of allowances allocated equals the number surrendered for 
compliance with the policy. Thus no adjustment is needed to account for allowances banked in 2020 in 
this case. 
Conclusion 
In sum, we estimate that the United States is on track to achieve emissions reductions of 16.3% by 
2020 relative to 2005 levels.  12 | BURTRAW & WOERMAN 
Important uncertainties are associated with the current path of US emissions reduction efforts that 
would have been lessened with the passage of comprehensive climate legislation. To forecast what 
will happen next in the United States, one must consider two key touchstones. One is the California 
program. If the first planned auction happens in November 2012, then the programme will almost 
certainly begin in January 2013, with big implications for the nation. It is likely to face various legal 
challenges, but for the most part it is expected to survive intact.  
Second is the finalisation of the new source performance standard for electric steam boilers, which is 
expected early next year, and the EPA’s posture in the development of existing source standards. The 
existing source standards may be more stringent than the technical documents have identified. That is 
because  it  is  a  state-driven  process  in  which  states  develop  implementation  plans  for  the  EPA’s 
approval. Many states  view this as an opportunity to strengthen and broaden the regional trading 
programs.  The  uncertainty  about  the  issuance  of  these  standards  is  a  concern,  but  the  legal 
requirements of the Clean Air Act are clear. A new administration could “slow walk” the regulatory 
development and delay it for years, but is unlikely to stop it altogether. 
Another  possibility  is  the  reversal  of  the  Clean  Air  Act,  or  at  least  the  removal  of  authority  for 
enforcing the GHG rules. This seems far-fetched because it would require an unbalanced legislature 
and  administration.  However,  a  less-extreme  outcome  could  be  for  a  new  legislature  and 
administration to defund the activities of the EPA in developing these rules. This would delay the rules 
indefinitely.  
If the eventualities play out as they currently are aligned, we find that not only is President Obama’s 
pledge  in Copenhagen  within reach, but emissions reductions within the  domestic  economy could 
actually be greater than would have occurred under comprehensive climate policy with cap and trade, 
as proposed by Waxman–Markey. The reason is that a large portion of the emissions reductions that 
were expected under cap and trade would have been offsets, whereas many of the factors driving 
emissions reductions under the current Clean Air Act regime would have been effectively or explicitly 
pre-empted under cap and trade. 
One might conjecture that advantageous changes in the economy that lead to emissions reductions 
under the Clean Air Act could have gone the other way, that is, they could have been disadvantageous 
changes that led to greater use of fossil fuel and greater GHG emissions. The inability of an emissions 
cap to capture emissions reductions from secular changes has the corollary that it prevents emissions 
increases resulting from economic growth or the greater use of fossil fuels. However, the course of 
history is not equally likely in this regard. Throughout developed economies the long-run trend is 
toward lower emissions intensity of economic activity. Since 1990 the GHG intensity of economic 
activity  in  the  United  States  has  fallen  by  33%,  along  with  the  intensity  of  most  other  forms  of 
pollution, even as overall economic activity and emissions have increased. Harrington et al. (2000) 
document that ex-post assessments of the cost of regulations tend to be less than anticipated, especially 
for incentive-based policies like cap and trade, often due to mistakes in forecasting the baseline against 
which necessary emissions reductions would be measured. In other words, an emissions cap set in 
statute is more likely to end up less stringent than more stringent compared to what was initially 
anticipated.  Incentive-based  approaches  would  have  a  better  environmental  performance  if  they 
accommodate this fact by  including rules to adjust their stringency  in response to changing costs 
(Burtraw et al., 2010). Regulatory approaches do so inherently. 
In  the  short  run,  to  the  surprise  of  many,  the  United  States  appears  able  to  meet  its  mitigation 
obligations under the Copenhagen agreement. In contrast, however, the United States seems off-course 
with  respect  to  meeting  its  financing  obligations  under  the  agreement.  Cap  and  trade  provided  a 
vehicle and incentive to direct private capital toward investment in developing countries through the 
purchase of emissions offsets. It also provided a source of funds for the federal government that could 
have supported the public fund contribution to the financing obligation. In contrast, under a regulatory 
approach, these avenues are not available. In particular, international offsets appear to be unavailable 
as a legal compliance instrument by which to meet GHG reduction standards under the Clean Air Act. AS ASSESSMENT OF US PROGRESS TOWARDS ITS PLEDGE ON CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION | 13 
The  sub-national  cap-and-trade  policies  allow  for  international  offsets,  but  their  supply  in  those 
programmes is limited. Private financing of energy development internationally is already extensive 
but generally could not be seen as an additional contribution to the outcome of US climate policy. In 
the absence of cap-and-trade policies in general, and an active offset market in particular, the United 
States is likely to have difficulty meeting its commitment to finance international investments. 
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